Employing an event study approach, we examine 5,574 bond return reactions to unexpected quarterly dividend change announcements in the U.S. corporate bond market over the period [2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010][2011][2012][2013][2014]. Overall, we report a significant bond price reaction in the same direction as dividend changes, which supports the hypothesis that dividend changes signal future firm performance. We also find that the bond return reaction is more pronounced if the dividends are reduced than if they are increased. We document a wealth transfer effect when riskier bonds are issued by firms with a low cash ratio and are approaching maturity. These results still hold after we control for the financial crisis and dividend covenants and when we use alternative variables to capture the dividend surprise.
Introduction
Dividend changes carry a significant amount of information for equity prices and dividends are the chief input of many valuation models (Boehme & Sorescu, 2002; Grullon, Michaely, & Swaminathan, 2002; Charitou, Lambertides, & Theodoulou, 2011; Nguyen, 2014) . However, the impact of dividend changes on corporate debt holders remains unclear.
This research question is important because the payout policy in the form of dividend payments can significantly affect firm valuation via capital budgeting and corporate financing decisions.
On the one hand, the information content hypothesis conjectures that corporate bond prices would move in the same direction as dividend changes (Woolridge, 1983; Handjinicolaou & Kalay, 1984) . This is because dividend dynamics signal firm performance and future cash flow. In particular, bond prices would decrease with dividend reductions, which signal firms' increased default risk. Bond prices would increase with dividend increases, especially when the raised dividends imply that the issuing firms are distancing from potential default. On the other hand, the wealth expropriation hypothesis (Jayaraman & Shastri, 1988; Dhillon & Johnson, 1994) predicts a negative relation between bond returns and dividend changes. This is because, under some very specific conditions, dividend increases announced by struggling firms could indicate potential wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders.
This study sets out to examine the two aforementioned hypotheses. We test corporate bond price responses to unexpected quarterly dividend change announcements using a large dataset from 2002 to 2014. We examine the overall relation between unexpected dividend changes and corporate bond returns using a more recent and comprehensive dataset. Woolridge (1983) and Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) provide preliminary evidence in support of the dividend information content hypothesis. However, Jayaraman and Shastri (1988) and Dhillon and Johnson (1994) find evidence of a wealth transfer effect when studying special dividends and large dividend changes, respectively. A re-examination of this research question is worthwhile, given more recent bond transaction data with comprehensive coverage at a daily frequency. The Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) database is recognised as one of the most reliable sources of bond data for testing bond price reactions to corporate events. Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009) show that, when daily transaction data are from a more developed database, such as TRACE, both the power and specification of the tests increase substantially. The level of detail of our data allows us to investigate whether a wealth transfer effect exists within a small group of riskier bonds where the propensity to transfer wealth from bondholders to equity holders is high.
To examine the impact of unexpected dividend changes on corporate bond prices, we employ an event study approach and compute corporate bond price response within an 11-day event window, [-5, +5] , surrounding quarterly dividend change announcements. Our sample comprises of 5,574 bond price reactions to quarterly dividend changes in the U.S. market over [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] . We find a significant relation between bond returns and dividend changes, suggesting that bondholders consider dividend information an important input of bond valuation. The effect is asymmetrical, with an average daily abnormal return of 0.015% for dividend increases, while that for dividend decreases is -0.065%, both significant at the 1 percent level. The corresponding bond price movements to dividend changes, similar to the findings of Woolridge (1983) and Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) , suggest a dominant dividend information content hypothesis in the bond market at an aggregate level.
We also find evidence supporting the dividend information content hypothesis across a range of bond risk levels. The price reactions to dividend changes from riskier bonds are stronger than those from safer bonds. This result is substantiated by the fact that bonds are not generally affected in value until the firm's ability to pay debt is impaired. A riskier firm is more likely to have such ability affected, given it is already close to the verge of default.
Finally, we find empirical evidence of a wealth transfer effect among a very selective group of firms. If a wealth transfer effect exists, we expect it to be manifested among firms with a high probability of default, a low cash ratio, and whose bonds are close to maturity. 1 Within such a group, we observe that corporate bond prices exhibit an average decrease of 0.025% per day (or 6.25% annually) when dividends are raised. Therefore, while a positive relation between dividend changes and corporate bond returns is largely observed at an aggregate level, within a small subsample of bonds with high default risk, there is an inverse relation between dividend changes and corporate bond returns, supporting the wealth transfer effect. This paper offers two main contributions. First, it generally contributes to the strand of literature on the conflict of interest between bondholders and shareholders, especially the competing hypotheses on the information content of dividend changes and the wealth expropriation of dividend changes. Several corporate events, such as corporate takeovers (Ghosh & Jain, 2000; Faccio & Masulis, 2005) , new equity issues (Eberhart & Siddique, 2002) , and share repurchases (Maxwell & Stephens, 2003; Jun, Jung, & Walkling, 2009; Nishikawa, Prevost, & Rao, 2011) , have been used as testing grounds to evaluate the conflict of interest between equity holders and bondholders. This study suggests a limited conflict of interest between equity holders and bondholders when it comes to payout policies, since 1 A firm's cash ratio is equal to the sum of cash and cash equivalent assets divided by short-term liabilities (Gombola & Ketz, 1983; Karels & Prakash, 1987; Callao, Jarne, & Laine, 2007; Lin, Ansell, & Andreeva, 2012) . bondholders view dividend changes that are influential in bond valuation similarly to how these matter in equity valuation. However, within highly risky firms where default is eminent, dividend increases are bad news to bondholders, suggesting a wealth transfer effect.
Second, this study contributes to the strand of literature on firm payout policy.
Dividends and share repurchases, as the two competing remuneration policies, have both received substantial research attention on their potential to cause a wealth transfer effect among firm investors. While Jun et al. (2009) successfully disentangle the wealth transfer effect from the signalling effect when examining share repurchases by controlling for stock options, ours is the first study that isolates the two separate effects of dividends. The coexistence of the information signalling effect and wealth transfer effect has been well argued and has yet never been identified in the prior literature. This study, through isolating the two separate effects, presents the heightened conditions under which bondholders view dividends inappropriate. The change in bondholders' views on dividends is especially important for firm future decision making, since firm management wants to avoid the bondholders' unfavourable views and subsequent negative reactions to the dividend changes.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the theoretical and empirical background for the two competing hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 discusses the methodology. Section 5 presents the empirical results of the main tests and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Theory and Literature
Dividends convey key information on both firm future performance and cash flow levels to financial market participants (Bhattacharya, 1979) . This is in line with the dividend smoothing behaviour raised by the seminal study of Lintner (1956) , who suggests that firms are often reluctant to change their dividend payout. Specifically, firm management understands how market participants interpret dividends as a signal of firm performance and therefore tries to reduce any unnecessary and especially unfavourable market responses by maintaining stable dividends. Management reluctance to change dividends is also known as the 'sticky' dividend policy. A number of empirical studies, including those of Healy and Palepu (1988) , Dhillon, Raman, and Ramirez (2001) , Hanlon, Myers, and Shevlin (2007) , Aggarwal, Cao, and Chen (2012) , and Chen and Kao (2014) , report a consistent positive correlation between dividend changes and firm future earnings. Because dividend changes are indicative of firm future performance, the equity market consistently reacts in the same direction as dividend changes (Boehme & Sorescu, 2002; Grullon et al., 2002; Charitou et al., 2011; Nguyen, 2014) .
In the corporate bond market, studies examining market response to dividend changes are, however, rather limited. This is mainly because the nature of corporate bonds as a public debt instrument does not present a clear link with dividends, as equity valuation does.
Specifically, corporate bond price is chiefly driven by market interest rates and the probability of default, whereas dividends are the key inputs in equity valuation. Hence, when a company with an AAA credit rating cuts dividends, this information could significantly upset shareholders because it signals lower future cash flows. One might not expect this to affect the price of corporate bonds, since the probability of default is very low for this particular firm. Woolridge (1983) , to the best of our knowledge, was the first to examine the impact of dividend changes on common stocks, preferred stocks, and corporate bonds. The author shows evidence that both equity prices and corporate bond prices respond in the same direction as dividend changes. Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) also show further evidence of decreased bond returns following dividend cuts. However, dividend increases lead to insignificant bond price reactions because firms' extra cash is distributed to shareholders via dividends, whereas bondholders' payments are capped at the pre-determined rate. Mathur, Singh, Nejadmalayeri, and Jiraporn (2013) examine the costs of debt (i.e. corporate bond yields) and dividend payouts. They show that, up to a certain dividend level, dividend payouts reduce the cost of debt.
An alternative plausible hypothesis is the wealth expropriation by managers and equity holders. Fama and Miller (1972) propose that the conflict between shareholders and bondholders of a firm arises when a decision made has different effects on the two groups. In addition, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) suggest dividends can cause wealth transfer between bondholders and shareholders if the dividends are funded by inappropriate sources. These studies propose that management can pay dividends using the funds for positive NPV investments. In such cases, dividend payments discriminate against bondholders by preventing them from enjoying the benefits of firm expansion through positive NPV investments. Kalay (1982) also suggests that dividends could have a detrimental effect on bondholder wealth if it eliminates cash available for debt servicing and the firm has to service debt by issuing new debt.
Based on early theoretical studies, later empirical evidence, such as that of Jayaraman and Shastri (1988), Dhillon and Johnson (1994) , and Qi, Roth, and Wald (2011) , supports the dividend wealth transfer hypothesis. For example, Jayaraman and Shastri (1988) report negative bond returns to special dividends. Dhillon and Johnson (1994) examine large dividend changes and report opposite stock and bond price reactions; that is, stock prices rise (fall) while bond prices fall (rise) in reaction to dividend increases (decreases). Both Jayaraman and Shastri (1988) and Dhillon and Johnson (1994) suggest that dividend increases result in lower levels of cash to service debt, thereby triggering negative bond price reactions. Qi et al. (2011) examine the wealth expropriation through examining shareholder control and debt covenants. They find that firms with stronger shareholder control involve more debt covenants, including dividend covenants, to minimise wealth transfer.
This study empirically investigates bond price reactions following unexpected dividend changes. We not only test the two competing hypotheses but also segment our data into various groups to allow for heterogeneity for each analysis. For example, we argue that riskier bonds should react to dividend announcements more strongly. This is substantiated by the fact that corporate bonds generate promised returns, which are only affected in cases of firm insolvency. The dividend changes of a cash-rich firm would change one's expectations regarding its future performance and cash flow levels, but not to the extent where its ability to service debt is impaired. Cash-poor firms face higher default risk and any information on changes in its future cash flows would cause greater concern and subsequent reactions from investors.
We then further segment our sample to explore the potential wealth transfer effect using firms' cash ratio and bond term to maturity. We argue that, while the overall market would consider dividend announcements a signal of firm performance, the wealth transfer effect should be more prominent among bonds issued by riskier firms with low cash ratios and when bonds are approaching maturity. Riskier bonds have a higher potential to experience wealth transfer, since cash dividends could reduce a firm's cash flow to a level that is insufficient to honour its debt payment (Alexander, Edwards, & Ferri, 2000) . Fan and Sundaresan (2000) , for example, even report that firms have greater incentives to pay dividends (as a last resort to remunerate their shareholders) before bankruptcy. This evidence suggests that highly risky firms under severe financial distress are more likely to use dividends to transfer wealth.
To identify these firms, we use the firm's cash ratio, which is directly linked with the firm's ability to service debt. Firms with low cash ratios would further constrain their cash flows for debt payment, which will lead to wealth transfer if they decide to increase dividends. This consequence would be more of a concern for bondholders whose bonds are approaching maturity. Because bonds near maturity signify approaching redemptions, the firm may not have sufficient time to recover from financial distress before the bond matures. We therefore use the probability of default, the firm's cash ratio, and bond time to maturity to identify this very selective group of bonds that are more likely to experience wealth transfer.
Data
We collect bond transaction data from the TRACE Enhanced dataset. This dataset, compared with the standard TRACE dataset, has the advantage of a complete transaction record of all corporate bonds since 2002. 2 We select a study period from 1 July 2002 to 30
September 2014. We obtain all bond issuance information, including the bond issuance date, maturity date, issuance amount, par value, coupon rate, and credit rating, from Mergent FISD.
For the purpose of this study, we select only U.S. non-convertible bonds with fixed coupon rates. The total number of TRACE bonds with issuance information available from Mergent FISD is 42,448, issued by 5,466 unique firms.
The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) reports firm dividend information, such as dividend announcement dates, dividend payments, and payment frequency. Financial firms are removed from the analysis because their dividends are possibly a by-product of their regulations (Fama & French, 2001; Goyal & Muckley, 2013; Mathur et al., 2013; Chen & Kao, 2014) . This study examines unexpected quarterly dividend changes, thereby
removing dividends paid at all other frequencies. 3 An unexpected dividend change in this study excludes a dividend initiation or omission. CRSP reports 29,753 such dividend changes.
To ensure the economic significance of these changes, according to Grullon et al. (2002) and Chen, Shevlin, and Tong (2007) , the dividend surprise must be greater than 10%. This section reduces the number of dividend changes to 16,573.
We then merge the bond transaction data with the dividend data on the window [-5, +5] , centred on the dividend announcement day. 4 Of the 16,573 dividend change announcements, only 2,018 (about 12%) have bond transactions observed over the event window. 5 The computation of bond buy-and-hold returns requires at least two transactions within the event window [-5, +5] , one before the announcement and another after the announcement. This requirement reduces the sample to 1,880 dividend changes and 8,816
bond reactions to these dividend changes. 6 Finally, we eliminate observations with contemporaneous earnings announcements, missing data on control variables, and outliers of daily bond returns greater than 2% or less than -2%. 7 The final sample comprises 5,574
observations. Table 1 presents the data cleaning details.
<Insert Table 1 about here>   Table 2 Accordingly, the average bond return reactions also appear to be negative. Panel B presents the sample distribution by industry. The sample covers 17 industries and the financial industry is excluded from our analyses.
<Insert Table 2 about here>
Methodology
We focus on bond price reaction following an unexpected dividend change. Following Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1994), Firth (1996) , and Amihud and Li (2006) , this study also uses the naive dividend expectation model to compute unexpected dividend changes. Dividends are described as following a smooth payout pattern, which suggests the best predictor of the current quarter's dividend is the dividend paid in the previous quarter. Following this notion, − −1 would present the actual and also the unexpected dividend change. Our proxy for unexpected dividend changes, _ ℎ , is captured by a quarterly dividend change standardised by the stock price. Specifically, _ ℎ is the qth quarterly dividend change announced by firm i standardised by the stock price at the month-end prior to the announcement:
7 The 2% and -2% bond returns correspond approximately to the top and bottom 1% of the sample.
Other alternative unexpected dividend change proxies (analysts' forecast errors and dividend percentage changes) are also employed to check the robustness of the results. These are discussed in Section 5.4.
Event Study Approach
This study first adopts an event study approach with a window [-5, +5 ] to test bond price reactions to unexpected dividend changes. We compute a daily abnormal return, (−5,+5) , for each bond reaction to a dividend announcement over the event window.
To calculate this return, we first calculate a bond buy-and-hold return over the interval that is then adjusted for the matching portfolio return. This is the abnormal bond return over the event window. To account for the different holding periods of each bond, we divide this abnormal bond return by the number of days the bond is held to calculate a daily abnormal bond return following De Franco, Vasvari, and Wittenberg-Moerman (2009) and Easton, Monahan, and Vasvari (2009) . For example, if a bond is traded on days -3 and +2, which determines a six-day holding period, while another one is traded on days -1 and +3, which determines a five-day holding period, the bond returns are incomparable due to different holding periods. This result is common in the corporate bond market, given its low liquidity, and therefore adjustments to daily returns are required for this type of event studies. Equations (2) to (5) present the calculation of this daily abnormal bond return:
where (−5,+5) is the buy-and-hold return for bond j issued by firm i over the window [-5, +5 ] of the qth dividend change; (−5,+5) and (−5,+5) are the bond sale price and purchase price, including accrued interest; and (−5,+5) is the coupon payment made during the holding period. Here, (−5,+5) must take place before or on the announcement day and (−5,+5) takes place after the announcement day. When there are multiple trades over the interval, the ones farthest from the announcement day are chosen. If there are multiple transactions in one day, we use the closing price as the transaction price.
We then adjust the bond buy-and-hold returns computed from Equation (2) by the matching corporate bond portfolio returns. Following Bessembinder et al. (2009) , we form corporate bond portfolios based on credit rating and time to maturity. We classify six rating groups -AAA, AA-to AA+, A-to A+, BBB-to BBB+, BB-to BB+, and below B+ -and three time to maturity groups -0 to 8 years, 9 to 11 years, and 12+ years. 9 We then form 18 bond portfolios and compute their weighted average returns by firm size. Equation (3) computes the abnormal corporate bond return:
where (−5,+5) is the abnormal bond return over the window [-5, +5] ; (−5,+5) is the bond buy-and-hold return; and (−5,+5) is the matched portfolio return. Finally, for standardisation purposes, we calculate daily abnormal bond returns for our analyses.
The variable (−5,+5) , is calculated by dividing (−5,+5) by the number of days bond j is held for the qth dividend announcement, (−5+5) :
If the observed daily abnormal return is statistically different from zero, then we observe evidence that unexpected dividend changes have a significant effect on bond prices.
Multivariate Regression
We further examine the relation between unexpected dividend changes and bond price changes using multivariate regression. The following model tests the relation between dividend changes and bond returns with control variables on bond and firm characteristics:
In this study, each bond reaction to a dividend announcement is treated as an individual observation. Because dividend announcements are a firm-level event and any firm can issue multiple bonds, correlations between observations can lead to upward-biased tstatistics in regression analyses. To reduce this autocorrelation, standard errors are clustered by both firm and time for regression analyses.
We first test the overall market response to dividend announcements. If the dividend contains information about firm performance and cash flow levels, 1 should be positive, meaning the bond prices and dividends would change in the same direction. If 1 is negative, then wealth transfer is evident. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in our analyses.
Results

Bond Price Reactions
The majority of the dividend changes are dividend increases, with only 7.2% of the sample being dividend cuts. On average, our sample bonds have a time to maturity of 10 years and an issuance of $475 million (with a natural log of 19.98).
<Insert Table 3 about here>   Table 4 presents the correlation matrix among the variables used in the regressions.
Both the Pearson product moment and the Spearman rank order indicate a positive correlation between dividend changes and bond returns, which is an early indication that dividend changes may signal firm performance, thereby leading bond prices to move in the same direction as dividend changes.
<Insert Table 4 about here> Panel A of Table 5 summarises the average abnormal bond returns in reaction to dividend increases and decreases. On average, firms experience much larger dividend cuts (-1.01% relative to the stock price) than dividend increases (0.107% relative to the stock price) and dividend cuts occur less frequently than dividend increases. 10 Dividend cuts are associated with a significant average daily abnormal return of -0.056% (or -14.11% annually) and dividend increases induce a daily return of 0.015% (or 3.78% annually). Both price responses are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The direction of the bond price changes primarily supports the dividend information content hypothesis. Furthermore, the magnitude of the negative bond return in reaction to dividend cuts is considerably greater than the positive bond return in reaction to dividend increases. Empirical studies such as those of Easton et al. (2009 ), May (2010 , and Chatrath, Hong, Ramchander, and Villupuram (2012) also report bond asymmetric reactions when examining earnings announcements, bond rating changes, and macroeconomic news, respectively. Specifically, they report stronger bond price reactions when firms announce negative periodic earnings, bond rating downgrades, and unfavourable macroeconomic news. Our results concur with these findings.
<Insert Table 5 about here> Panel B of Table 5 disaggregates the sample into deciles. Decile 1 contains the strongest negative dividend changes and decile 10 contains the strongest positive dividend changes. A few deciles exhibit statistically significant average returns, while other deciles have signs largely consistent with those of the dividend changes. Deciles 1 and 10, as the most significant deciles, also contribute the most significant returns.
In addition to the event study method, we use ordinary least squares regression with standard errors clustered at the time (calendar quarter) and firm levels to test the relation between bond abnormal returns and dividend changes. Table 6 presents the results from the regressions. After controlling for firm and bond characteristics, we find the bond returns have a significantly positive correlation with dividend changes. The coefficient suggests that, for every 1% dividend change relative to the stock price, the average daily bond return will change by 0.0591% (or 14.89% annually) in the same direction as the dividend changes. This evidence is consistent with the significant average return reaction to dividend increases and decreases, as reported in Table 5 . Overall, we conclude that the overall market reaction to dividend changes is in line with the dividend information content hypothesis.
<Insert Table 6 about here> Table 6 also shows that bond price reactions to dividend cuts are stronger than those to dividend increases. The variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for dividend cut announcements and zero otherwise. The coefficient of the interaction term * _ ℎ is significantly positive, suggesting that, for every 1% dividend change relative to the stock price, the daily bond return reaction to dividend cuts is 0.0581%
higher than that to dividend increases in terms of magnitude. This result is well supported by the corporate bond asymmetric payoff function (Black & Scholes, 1973) , which determines the low bond price sensitivity to favourable firm news. Specifically, the bond pricing model suggests the bondholders' limited entitlement to the firm's increased profits, since they only deserve the pre-determined coupon payment and face value redemption.
Risk and Bond Price Reactions
In this section, we segment the sample according to bond riskiness and then conduct our empirical analyses. Essentially, we expect the effect of dividend changes may not be the same for bonds at different ends of the risk spectrum. For example, a dividend cut for an AAA credit rating bond may not result in any bond price movement at all. This is because the probability of default for an AAA credit rating bond is very low and a dividend cut is unlikely to affect the cash flows to the holders of this bond. We use two variables to capture the risk. One is the KMV probability of default of the issuing firm, a firm-level default risk, and the other is the bond credit rating, which indicates the likelihood of firm default on that bond payment. 11 Tables 7 and 8 present these analyses. Table 7 presents the bond return reactions to dividend changes with different probabilities of default. We divide our sample into three groups: those with less than a 0.0001% probability of default (i.e. almost 0% probability of default), those with a probability of default between 0.0001% and 10%, and those with more than a 10% probability of default.
12 Table 7 presents a set of results consistent with the information hypothesis. We observe that the bond price still reacts positively to dividend increase news, even among low-risk firms.
We report an average return of 0.013% per day (or 3.25% annually) among low-risk firms and this abnormal return is significant at the 1 percent level. Similar results are also observed for the medium-risk group (probability of default between 0.0001% and 10%) when dividends are increased. The magnitude of the price reaction for the medium-risk group is about three times that of the low-risk group. This result is also consistent with our expectations. The result shows no price reaction to dividend cuts for the low-and mediumrisk groups. This is to be expected for the low-risk group but not for the medium-risk group.
We revisit this result using a different risk measurement below. Finally, we observe large price reductions when high-risk firms cut dividends. The magnitude of the price reaction is about 11 times that for dividend increases for low-risk firms. Such a result provides strong support for our original finding in the previous section, that bondholders interpret dividend information as an indication of firm performance.
<Insert Table 7 about here>   Table 8 segments the sample by bond credit ratings, which are used to classify bonds into investment-grade and speculative-grade groups. This is a more popular method of classifying bond risks (Downing, Underwood, & Xing, 2009; Easton et al., 2009; Jostova, Nikolova, Philipov, & Stahel, 2013) . We divide our sample into four groups: AAA to AA-, A+ to A-, BBB+ to BBB-, and below BB+ (speculative grade). Overall, the findings remain consistent with the information hypothesis and the results presented above. Bonds with a credit rating of A-and above do not react much to dividend changes. This is because there is little or no upside for these bonds with dividend increases. At the same time, these bonds are too far from any risk of default and so any dividend cut would be unlikely to affect their payment pattern. All the reactions among the two groups are observed at the borderline of investment grade. A dividend increase leads to a positive price reaction and a dividend cut lowers the bond price. The abnormal returns are all significant at the 1 percent level. Such results are intuitively plausible, given how differently investors view investment-grade versus speculative-grade bonds.
<Insert Table 8 about here>
The Wealth Transfer Effect
The wealth transfer hypothesis argues that bond prices could fall following a dividend increase. For a struggling firm, a dividend increase could be a sign of potential wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders. This classic agency problem has been empirically documented by Jayaraman and Shastri (1988) and Dhillon and Johnson (1994) . More recent evidence on possible wealth transfer related to dividend announcements is, however, scant.
The objective of this section is to further divide our sample into smaller groups that are most likely to show evidence of the wealth transfer effect. Our research is guided by the existing theory on wealth transfer (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977) .
First, wealth transfer could occur among a group of firms that are close to default. In these instances, bondholders are creditors and they have first rights to any assets in the event of default. Thus, if wealth transfer is taking place, it would occur in the group with the highest probability of default. We choose a 10% probability of default level, since this is sufficiently high for a default to occur but to still have a reasonable sample size. The second dimension is cash. Since dividends are often distributed in the form of cash, cash-poor firms are likely to suffer more from wealth transfer practices. We use a firm's cash ratio to proxy for the level of cash within the firm. This is measured by the sum of cash and cash equivalent assets divided by short-term liabilities (Gombola & Ketz, 1983; Karels & Prakash, 1987; Callao et al., 2007; Lin et al., 2012) . Firms with a cash ratio of less than one face higher liquidity risk. We focus on these firms to look for evidence of expropriation. Finally, the third dimension is the bonds' time to maturity. While expropriation affects all bondholders, the marginal effect is much greater for bonds closer to maturity. If a firm is close to default, the holder of a bond with five years to maturity is likely to be affected whether expropriation occurs or not. On the other hand, a bond that is close to maturity could be redeemed in full without expropriation. In addition, bonds that are close to maturity are much more liquid and we are therefore more likely to observe the effect of wealth transfer among shorter-maturity bonds. Table 9 presents the details of these highly risky bonds with different terms to maturity.
<Insert Table 9 about here>   From Table 9 , we can see that, when firms have a probability of default greater than 10%, bonds are likely to exhibit a negative reaction to dividend increases if they are within 12 months of maturity and their issuers have a low cash ratio, below one. Cash ratios below one could suggest a short-term cash shortfall in the near future, drawing bondholders' attention to firm solvency. In addition, bonds approaching maturity could cause greater investor concern because any short-term cash flow constraints may be irreversible before the bond matures. Thus, any bond with these heightened risk and investor concerns would react negatively to a dividend increase announcement, since such an announcement would further deteriorate the firm's financial ability. Our results in Table 9 suggest that this average daily bond return reaction is -0.025% (or -6.15% annually). This evidence provides support for the wealth transfer hypothesis associated with dividend change announcements when the bondissuing firms have high probabilities of default, low cash ratios, and bonds close to maturity.
This evidence, which appears in a very small group, 31 out of a sample of 5,050, has been offset by the overwhelming dividend signalling effect observed when examining overall market reactions to dividend announcements. 13 All the other groups of bonds, such as those with maturity longer than 12 months or a high cash ratio above one, are far from displaying the wealth transfer effect.
Robustness Checks
The first robustness test involves removing the 2008-2009 observations to obtain the results without the potential impact of the financial crisis. During the financial crisis period, bond prices could be more sensitive to firm news and, arguably, our results could be mainly driven by the behaviour of bonds during the crisis period. After dropping the crisis period, we have 4,906 bond reactions to dividend changes and the results remain largely the same.
The second robustness test is to examine the impact of dividend covenants on our results. The dividend covenant information is obtained from the Mergent FISD database and, surprisingly, only 95 of our 5,574 observations have dividend covenants at the time of the dividend announcements. Theses 95 bond observations are almost exclusively speculativegrade bonds, which have attracted more creditor attention to include dividend covenants. This is a relatively small set of sample and does not affect our conclusion from the main tests.
The third robustness test uses a firm's average abnormal bond return instead of the individual abnormal bond return as the dependent variable for analyses. In the main tests, 13 The sample size is reduced from 5,574 to 5,050 when we require information on the bond time to maturity and the firm's cash ratio.
each bond reaction to a dividend announcement is treated as an individual observation, Analysts' forecast errors capture the discrepancy between the market expected dividend levels and the actual dividend levels, which is a true surprise to investors. The results from this robustness test are qualitatively consistent with those from the main tests.
The last robustness test is to use dividend percentage changes,
, as the independent variable (Grullon et al., 2002) . The dividend change computed using this method can be very different from the dividend change relative to the stock price adopted in the main tests. A large dividend percentage change could be very small relative to the stock price if the dividend yield (i.e. dividend relative to stock price) is very low for that stock. The results from this test are qualitatively robust.
Conclusion
Employing a comprehensive set of data on bond transactions, this study reports evidence of a dividend signalling effect when examining overall corporate bond market reactions to dividend changes. Bond prices increase (decrease) following unexpected dividend increases (decreases). We report that the information content of dividend cut announcements is greater than that of dividend increase announcements, as evidenced by the stronger bond price reactions towards dividend cuts over dividend increases. This asymmetric bond price reaction is supported by Black and Scholes (1973) bond pricing model, which determines high bond price sensitivity to unfavourable firm news.
In addition, firm risk affects bond price reactions to dividend announcements. Riskier bonds exhibit stronger price reactions to dividend changes and such price movements are in the same direction as the dividend changes. We conclude that the empirical evidence in this study supports the dividend information content hypothesis for bonds at different risk levels (classified by the firm's probability of default and the bond credit rating).
We then look for evidence of the wealth transfer effect within our sample. Motivated by the prior literature on wealth expropriation, we further partition the riskier bond group by the firm's cash ratio and the bond time to maturity. We find a small group of bondsidentified by a term to maturity of less than 12 months and a low cash ratio, below one -react negatively to dividend increases. Our 31 observations, which comprise a very small subsample with extreme characteristics prone to expropriation, show support for the wealth transfer hypothesis.
While many studies explore dividend and equity pricing, the impact of dividend changes on corporate debtholders remains unclear. This study makes an important contribution to the literature by reconciling the dividend information content hypothesis and the wealth transfer hypothesis. We show that the dividend payout policy is important to bondholder returns. The magnitude of the impact depends on the direction of dividend changes, credit risk, firm's cash ratio, and the bond time to maturity. Importantly, we show that the dividend information content hypothesis and the wealth transfer hypothesis are not mutually exclusive. While the overall findings support the information content hypothesis, we show evidence of wealth transfer in a small group of high-risk, low-cash bonds close to maturity. Firth, M. (1996) . Dividend changes, abnormal returns, and intra-industry firm valuations. [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] . A total of 42,448 of these bonds have the relevant issuance information available from the Mergent FISD database as required by this study. The CRSP database contains 29,753 quarterly dividend change announcements over our sample period. To ensure the economic significance of dividend changes, dividend announcements with absolute percentage changes less than 10% are excluded from the analysis. After merging the TRACE Enhanced data with the dividend announcement data, we have 9,591 bond reactions to dividend announcements. Our final sample size is 5,574 after eliminating observations with contemporaneous earnings announcements, outliers, and further requesting available data on control variables. Panel A presents the sample distribution by year. It includes the total number of dividend changes, the number of dividend increases versus dividend cuts, the average dividend levels, the average dividend changes, and the average daily bond return reactions to dividend changes. The dividend changes presented in this table are relative to the stock prices. They are computed as the difference between the dividend payments of the current quarter and the previous one, standardised by the stock price at the month-end prior to the dividend announcement. The dividend level is the current dividend payment over the stock price at the month-end prior to the dividend announcement. Panel B presents the sample distribution by industry. The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry codes are used to classify the industries. Finance firms are excluded because their dividends are largely affected by regulations. (−5,+5) is the average daily abnormal bond return over the window [-5, +5] , where day 0 is the dividend announcement day; it is the difference between the event period daily bond return and the matched daily bond portfolio return.
_ ℎ is the unexpected dividend change for the qth quarter announced by firm i. It is computed as the current quarterly dividend minus the previous one standardised by the stock price at the month-end prior to the announcement.
is a dummy variable to capture dividend cuts. It takes a value of one for dividend cuts and zero otherwise.
is the probability of default for firm i at the time of the qth dividend announcement. _ is the bond trade incidence, which captures bond liquidity. It equals the ratio of the number of days bond j trades in the month prior to the qth dividend announcement to 30 (the number of days in a month).
is the years to maturity for bond j on the announcement day.
is the logarithm of the total face value of the jth bond issued by firm i.
captures the dividend yield at the end of the (q -1)th quarter. is the firm size for the qth quarter. It is the logarithm of the market value of equity.
is the firm market-to-book ratio for the qth quarter and is the firm's Tobin's q. , ℎ_ ℎ , and _ ℎ are the firm's debt-to-equity ratio, growth in cash, and growth in gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i in the qth quarter, respectively. (−5,+5) is the average daily abnormal bond return over the window [-5, +5] , where day 0 is the dividend announcement day. It is the difference between the event period daily bond return and the matched daily bond portfolio return.
is a dummy variable to capture dividend cuts. It takes a value of one for dividend cuts and zero otherwise. _ is the bond trade incidence, which captures bond liquidity. It equals the ratio of the number of days bond j trades in the month prior to the qth dividend announcement to 30 (the number of days in a month).
is the years to maturity for bond j on the announcement day. is the logarithm of the total face value of the jth bond issued by firm i.
−1 captures the dividend yield at the end of the (q -1)th quarter. is the firm size for the qth quarter. It is the logarithm of the market value of equity. is the firm market-to-book ratio for the qth quarter and is the firm's Tobin's q. , ℎ_ ℎ , and _ ℎ are the firm's debt-to-equity ratio, growth in cash, and growth in gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i in the qth quarter, respectively. Significance levels are presented in italics.
Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients are above (below) diagonal (−5,+5) _ ℎ _ Panel A summarises the average abnormal bond returns in response to dividend increases and decreases. _ ℎ is the unexpected dividend change for the qth quarter announced by firm i. It is computed as the current quarterly dividend minus the previous one standardised by the stock price at the month-end prior to the announcement. (−5,+5) is the average daily abnormal bond return over the window [-5, +5] , where day 0 is the dividend announcement day. It is the difference between the event period daily bond return and the matched daily bond portfolio return. Panel B presents the dividend change deciles and their corresponding abnormal bond returns. Decile 1 contains the most negative dividend changes and decile 10 contains the most positive dividend changes. The heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent Newey-West standard error is used to calculate the t-statistics for each return. *Indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level, ***indicates significance at the 1% level. is a dummy variable to capture dividend cuts. It takes a value of one for dividend cuts and zero otherwise. _ is the bond trade incidence, which captures bond liquidity. It equals the ratio of the number of days bond j trades in the month prior to the qth dividend announcement to 30.
−1 captures the dividend yield in percentage at the end of the (q -1)th quarter.
is the firm size for the qth quarter. It is the logarithm of the market value of equity.
is the firm market-to-book ratio for the qth quarter and is the firm's Tobin's q. , ℎ_ ℎ , and _ ℎ are the firm's debt-to-equity ratio, growth in cash, and growth in gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i in the qth quarter, respectively. Year effect is fixed for all regressions. *Indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level, ***indicates significance at the 1% level. The t-statistics are in italics.
Variables
(1) _ ℎ is the unexpected dividend change for the qth quarter announced by firm i. It is computed as the current quarterly dividend minus the previous one standardised by the stock price at the monthend prior to the announcement. (−5,+5) is the average daily abnormal bond return over the window [-5, +5] , where day 0 is the dividend announcement day. It is the difference between the event period daily bond return and the matched daily bond portfolio return.
is the probability of default for firm i at the time of the qth dividend announcement. The heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent Newey-West standard error is used to calculate the t-statistics for each return. *Indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level, ***indicates significance at the 1% level. This table presents the abnormal bond returns surrounding dividend changes for investment-grade and speculative-grade bonds. _ ℎ is the unexpected dividend change for the qth quarter announced by firm i. It is computed as the current quarterly dividend minus the previous one standardised by the stock price at the month-end prior to the announcement. (−5,+5) is the average daily abnormal bond return over the window [-5, +5] , where day 0 is the dividend announcement day. It is the difference between the event period daily bond return and the matched daily bond portfolio return. The heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent Newey-West standard error is used to calculate the t-statistics for each return. *Indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level, ***indicates significance at the 1% level. When the number of observations is below 30, a Wilcoxon signed rank test is employed to test statistical significance and the t-statistics are therefore not available.
Bond groups
Credit ratings This table presents the average bond return reactions to dividend increases for different times to maturity and cash ratio groups, given a subsample of firms with a probability of default greater than 10%. We only report return reactions to dividend increases because dividend decreases would not signal a wealth transfer effect at all. The firm's cash ratio is equal to the sum of cash and cash equivalent assets divided by short-term liabilities.
(−5,+5) is the average daily abnormal bond return over the window [-5, +5] , where day 0 is the dividend announcement day. It is the difference between the event period daily bond return and the matched daily bond portfolio return. The t-statistics are in parentheses and the number of observations is in italics. When the number of observations is below 30, a Wilcoxon signed rank test is employed to test statistical significance and t-statistics are therefore not available. *Indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level, ***indicates significance at the 1% level.
Mean (− ,+ ) 
